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Martha Nussbaum is one of the most well-known contemporary philosophers; her prolific 
and diverse body of work includes books on emotions, political theory, literature, ancient 
philosophy, law, feminism, and the value of a liberal arts education. In her most recent 
book, Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach, Nussbaum does not 
tackle a new topic. Instead, the book offers a shorter and more accessible summary of the 
work done in three of her previous books: Women and Human Development: The 
Capabilities Approach; Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality and Species 
Membership; and The Quality of Life (edited with Amartya Sen). For those familiar with 
these excellent books, Creating Capabilities does not offer much that is new. This book 
provides a short and accessible introduction to Nussbaum’s work; as such, it is ideal for 
those who are new to her writing or for those looking for a short supplementary text for a 
class in political philosophy. 
 
As many people know, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has long been the official 
measure of a country’s quality of life: the higher the GDP, the higher the quality of life. 
In Creating Capabilities, Nussbaum convincingly problematizes this assumption. For 
example, because GDP is an average, a country with a fairly high GDP may not be a just 
society; GDP “doesn’t tell us where the wealth is located, who controls it, and what 
happens to the people who don’t” (49). Furthermore, GDP does not look at some factors 
that are important when evaluating the quality of people’s lives: their health, education 
level, and living conditions, for example. In short, it’s overly simplistic and misguided to 
call a country “developed” just because its GDP has increased; measuring the quality of  
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life of a nation in narrow monetary terms ignores issues of justice, distribution, equality, 
oppression, and freedom. 
 
Creating Capabilities does not just offer a critique of GDP; it goes further by presenting 
an alternative. Developed by Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen—a Nobel prize-
winning economist—, the “Capabilities Approach” (also known as the “Capability 
Approach” or the “Human Development Approach”) presents a new theoretical paradigm. 
Although fairly new, this approach has had increasing influence on the World Bank and 
the United Nations. The Human Development Index, for example, is a measure of quality 
of life that has been increasingly replacing GDP in policy discussions. 
 
The Capability Approach (CA) asks, "What are people actually able to do and to be?" (p. 
x) and which capabilities are the most valuable, “the ones that a minimally just society 
will endeavor to nurture and support?” (28). For Nussbaum, a good, flourishing life 
requires the protection of ten central capabilities: life; bodily health; bodily integrity; 
senses, imagination and thought; emotions; practical reason; affiliation; other species; 
play; and control over one's environment (33-34). She notes that this list is just a proposal 
and admits that it could be contested and is “subject to ongoing revision and rethinking” 
(108). She believes, however, that the list gives a good indication of the central 
capabilities that are important to all people and argues that societies need to ensure that 
every person’s central capabilities are protected up to a minimum threshold. Nussbaum is 
particularly interested in developing the CA as a theory of social justice and developing 
guidelines that might be useful to those working in constitutional law. 
 
The book presents an overview of this theoretical approach as well as its application to a 
number of contemporary issues. The first chapter of the book immediately grips the 
reader with the story of Vasanti, an Indian woman who has had a difficult life. The story 
gets to the tenets of the CA in an intuitive way, showing us the important aspects of life 
that GDP leaves unaccounted for. 
 
In chapter two, she gives a more detailed explanation of the CA and its central concepts 
such as the difference between functioning and capability. To illustrate this difference, 
Nussbaum gives a vivid example—a strategy she often employs in her work. Here, she 
presents the case of a person who is fasting and one who is starving. The two have the 
same functioning, but they have different capabilities. The person who is fasting has the 
freedom and ability to eat, while the person starving does not. The CA focuses on the 
promotion of capabilities, not functioning; in other words, it aims to promote freedoms 
and choices for people, so that they can have the capabilities to experience a higher 
quality of life. 
 
One might wonder here if focusing on giving people choice is the correct move. In 
criticizing preference utilitarianism, Nussbaum points out people may suffer from 
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adaptive preferences. These are preferences deformed by oppressive living conditions. 
Women, for example, may not complain about being illiterate or unable to vote if they 
have grown up in a culture that tells them from an early age that women should not be 
literate or vote. Nussbaum argues that deferring to these women’s preferences in this case 
will not improve their quality of life. Yet, in developing her own theory, she argues that, 
except in the case of children, societies need to “honor the person’s lifestyle choices” 
(26). Various scholars, including Cass Sunstein, with whom Nussbaum has worked in the 
past, have pointed out that people often do not make the most rational choices; we can 
“nudge” them to make better choices for themselves—such as picking fresh fruit instead 
of unhealthy desserts—and thus come closer to ensuring that they live longer and 
healthier lives. However, Nussbaum makes it clear that she is not interested in directly 
promoting health or education (two central capabilities); she is only interested in allowing 
people the freedoms that would enable them to make the choice to lead healthy and 
educated lives. 
 
Surprisingly, Nussbaum argues that two capabilities “play a distinctive architectonic role: 
they organize and pervade the others” (39; italics are hers). I expected her to name “life” 
and “bodily integrity,” but instead she argues for the centrality of affiliation and practical 
reason. At first, I was not at all convinced that affiliation should play such an important 
role, and it was not clear to me why practical reason should play a more important role 
than “life.” Nussbaum argues that practical reason allows us to choose and order the 
functioning corresponding to the various capabilities” (39). But life is a prerequisite to 
having capabilities at all, and physical and mental health allow us to exercise our 
practical reason and other capabilities, including the ability for affiliation. 
 
Although she does not present an argument for giving priority to practical reason, 
Nussbaum might be able to argue that if we are not allowed to develop our practical 
reason, we are not able to make rational choices involving the other capabilities and are 
more likely to fall victim to adaptive preferences. Furthermore, without practical reason, 
we cannot make informed choices about important aspects of our lives, such as 
terminating or extending our lives. Practical reason can thus be said to be a prerequisite 
for all other capabilities. Nussbaum also does not justify her claim that affiliation should 
play a central role. However, if I were to guess, I would say that she would give two 
reasons. First, affiliation involves appropriate interactions with other people including 
interactions with people who are different than us. This allows us to exercise and develop 
our practical reason and make more inclusive and informed decisions. Second, affiliation, 
as defined by Nussbaum, involves caring for other people and attempting to protect their 
well being. This is particularly important for the CA because, as Nussbaum herself 
admits, the CA depends on altruism much more than contractarianism or other ethical 
theories. I am still not convinced that practical reason and affiliation are more important 
than life and health—especially if this includes mental health—, but if these are the type 
of arguments that Nussbaum has in mind, I might be persuaded.   
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Titled “A Necessary Counter-Theory,” Chapter 3 of the book outlines the problems with 
GDP that I described above. It also briefly discusses problems with utilitarianism and 
resource-based approaches. The chapter ends with a discussion of the similarities and 
differences between the CA and human rights approaches. 
 
Chapter 4 gives an overview of the main philosophical questions that arise when thinking 
about the CA. A non-philosopher is likely to be lost in the intricacy of the philosophical 
debates as well as the names and terms thrown around (Rawls, Kant, consequentialism, 
deontology, informed-desire welfarism). On the other hand, a philosopher is likely to find 
this chapter short and lacking, since it only briefly touches on serious and complicated 
philosophical questions. However, for those interested in writing about the capabilities 
approach, this chapter might offer some inspiration and some possible questions to 
address. 
 
In Chapter 5, Nussbaum focuses on defending the CA against charges of cultural 
imperialism. Although she makes a persuasive argument, my concern is that she goes too 
far, giving nations too much power. Nussbaum claims that the government’s role is to 
raise “citizens above the threshold on all ten capabilities” (109); setting the correct 
threshold is thus pivotally important. It may be surprising then to hear that Nussbaum 
believes that “setting the threshold precisely is a matter for each nation, and within 
certain limits, it is reasonable for nations to do this differently” (41). Why should nations 
have so much power? Nussbaum has written extensively about this, and she addresses the 
topic again in Chapter 5. Suffice it to say that the answer has to do with the fact that 
Nussbaum values history, tradition, and religion; she wants to allow nations to make 
decisions that take into account their particular cultural and religious traditions, though 
she makes no explicit argument for their inherent value. From the point of view of the 
capabilities approach, it seems that these should only be valuable if they ensure the 
protection of people’s central capabilities. Nussbaum seems to worry that it would be 
“dictatorial” (42) to set the same threshold for all countries, but I remain unconvinced 
that it is just for some nations to set the threshold much lower than other nations. 
Investing nations with the power to set their own threshold displaces rather than resolves 
the power of a “dictatorial” decision. I am especially concerned since, as Nussbaum 
points out, “the tradition of a place is simply the view of the most powerful members of 
the culture” (107). Nussbaum herself argues, “once we understand this point, it is very 
difficult to think of traditional values as having any normative force at all” (107). Despite 
this difficulty, she continues to give a lot of weight to tradition and culture. She does 
argue that we need to find out what minorities, women, rural people and other oppressed 
groups think. But groups in power rarely seek out these groups, especially in countries 
with serious social inequities. How can we defer to them then and grant them the power 
to decide the threshold for each capability? And even if we search the views of oppressed 
groups, their words may not be reliable if they might suffer from adaptive preferences. 
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Nussbaum claims that even sophisticated utilitarian theories are unable to “correct the 
problem of adaptation, because it involves people’s entire upbringing in a society” (83). 
Yet, she says that we need to respect people’s choices (107). It seems that the CA may 
suffer—at least to some extent—from the same problem that she attributes to the 
sophisticated utilitarian theories she criticizes. This is not a unique fault of the CA, 
however, since the problem of adaptive preferences remains unresolved in other current 
theories as well. 
 
Chapter 6 focuses on the requirements of global justice. Here, Nussbaum rightly points 
out that there are large inequities among nations, and they are increasing. Many people 
live below the threshold required by the CA from the very beginning of their lives. 
Nussbaum shows that rich nations are partially responsible for these inequities and some 
redistribution is needed. While I disagree with her rejection of Peter Singer’s and Peter 
Unger’s call for an increase in personal philanthropy, I agree with her that we need to 
(also) focus on the obligations of governments and institutions. 
 
Chapter 7, which is dedicated to the philosophical influences of the CA, has similar 
virtues and problems as those in chapter 4. Nussbaum draws on very different thinkers 
and ideas here to support her theory and show its philosophical roots. Some philosophers 
will find these discussions thought provoking and intriguing. Others are likely to be 
irritated by them, finding the discussion too rushed and unfulfilling. Meanwhile, many 
non-philosophers may be confused or uninterested in what CA might have in common 
with Aristotle, Cicero, Seneca, Adam Smith, natural law, or utilitarianism.  
 
Chapter 8, titled “Capabilities and Contemporary Issues,” deals with poverty, gender, 
disability and aging, education, animal entitlements, environmental quality, constitutional 
law, and human psychology. This chapter is extremely accessible and clear, offering a 
nice summary of some of the issues discussed at more length in Nussbaum’s other books, 
especially Women and Human Development and Frontiers of Justice. However, the 
chapter also offers new insights, as well as some slight revisions of earlier positions taken 
by Nussbaum. For example, in spite of dedicating over eighty pages to showing that 
animals have similar entitlements to humans in Frontiers of Justice, never mentions 
factory farming there. In Creating Capabilities, I was pleased to see her say that factory 
farming “inflicts great injustices and should be ended” (163). 
  
I commend Nussbaum for showing that non-human animals have similar capabilities to 
humans and are entitled to similar protections. I am also happy to see her taking a 
stronger stance against animal exploitation in this book. However, I worry that what she 
wants to say about animals in this chapter might not fit very well with the rest of the book. 
As she presents so much of her theoretical framework in terms of human dignity and 
human flourishing, it may not apply to animals as well as she hopes. And how does her 
argument that affiliation and practical reason play architectonic roles extend to solitary 
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animals or to animals might not have the capacity for practical reason? I suggested earlier 
that life and health might be better capabilities to emphasize as being foundational. That 
would work better with her desire to argue that non-human animals deserve protection 
and support. 
 
Because it is so clear, accessible, and engaging, this book would make an excellent 
textbook for an upper level or graduate class in social and political philosophy. Since it is 
short and inexpensive, it would be easy to add this to the list of required texts for a class. 
Another option is to assign the first chapter or the first two chapters; I plan to do this in 
my introductory ethics class next semester. I think the book as a whole, and the first two 
chapters in particular, are very readable and appealing to students and non-academic 
audiences. 
 
Academic philosophers may be struck by how often Nussbaum says an issue needs 
further investigation and how often she draws attention to different ways of interpreting 
or applying the CA. They might see these tactics as an encouragement to read Women 
and Human Development and Frontiers of Justice, both of which are really excellent 
books that I would highly recommend. But they might also think that Nussbaum is trying 
to encourage her audience to engage with the CA more by reading and writing about it. 
They would be right; at the very end of the book’s conclusion, Nussbaum notes that the 
readers of this book are the “authors of the next chapter in this story of human 
development” (187). In the postscript, she points out that there are many opportunities for 
networking among people interested in this work. The Human Development and 
Capability Association has over 700 members from 80 countries. Annual international 
conferences offer the opportunity for intellectual exchanges and discussions, as does the 
Journal of Human Development and Capabilities. Like Nussbaum, I hope that 
philosophers, as well as other academics, will do more work on the CA. This theory is 
relatively new and exciting, offering much opportunity for rigorous and stimulating work. 
Furthermore, because of the attention that it has received from the UN and various 
governments, the CA has the potential to make a meaningful difference in American and 
international public policy. 
